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The footwear industry
in Vale do Sinos (Brazil):
competitive adjustment in
a labour-intensive sector
Achyles Barcelos da Costa
This article analyses the production relocation strategies deployed 
by firms in the Vale do Sinos footwear cluster in Rio Grande do Sul, in 
response to competitive pressures from other parts of the world, mainly 
Asia. The hypothesis proposed here is that, as the sector competes 
mainly in terms of product price, the factors that most directly influence 
that variable —such as wages, the exchange rate and tax and financial 
incentives— have affected the industry’s spatial distribution. The study’s 
main conclusions are that, since 1990, footwear production has been 
migrating to other parts of Brazil and firms have been seeking other 
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Since the mid-1990s, the footwear, furniture and 
clothing industries, along with other activities in 
the Brazilian economy, have been facing intense 
international competition. The competitive features 
that have the greatest impact on those productive 
sectors are market globalization; new forms of 
competition and, of particular importance for the 
case at hand, the presence of competitors from other 
regions of the world, particularly Asia, which enjoy 
more competitive conditions in terms of cost and 
labour supply. This article will review the productive 
relocation strategies deployed by firms of the Vale 
do Sinos footwear cluster, in Rio Grande do Sul, in 
response to this situation. The hypothesis proposed 
is that as the sector competes mainly in terms of the 
price of its footwear products, the factors that most 
directly affected the price attribute, namely wages, 
exchange rates, and tax and financial incentives, 
have influenced the direction of the industry’s spatial 
location. The sector is turning its attention towards 
other factors of  competitiveness, apart from cost-
related ones. Nonetheless, the search for regions 
offering lower production costs remains the basis for 
business decision-making in the sector, particularly in 
firms that continue to produce large volumes. 
The methodology used in this paper consists of a 
review of the theoretical literature on the competitive 
advantages of production in local productive clusters; 
the empirical literature on the footwear industry, 
particularly in Vale do Sinos; and official statistics 
on footwear-industry employment and exports. These 
data are supplemented by journalistic information on 
footwear manufacturing firms that have geographically 
relocated their production units. 
Since the mid-1990s, production and employment 
in the Brazilian footwear industry has fluctuated 
broadly in line with exchange-rate variations. The 
stabilization policy implemented in the Brazilian 
economy as from July 1994 —the Real Plan— which 
aimed to control inflation through monetary and 
exchange-rate policy, produced periods of exchange-
rate appreciation, for example in 1994-1999 and 2004-
2008, that undermined returns in sectors that compete 
mainly on price. This pressure was intensified by the 
presence of international competitors, particularly 
from the Asian continent, which have abundant and 
cheap labour available. The overall result is competitive 
pressure that makes it increasingly difficult for Brazilian 
firms to survive in their markets, if  their exclusive 
source of competitiveness is production costs. 
The key argument propounded in this paper is 
that various segments of the footwear industry in Rio 
Grande do Sul and other regions of Brazil will find 
it increasingly hard to compete in foreign markets 
exclusively through the price of their products, so they 
will need to develop other attributes of competitiveness. 
Nonetheless, until the industry develops new capacities, 
price-based competition is forcing it to relocate its 
activities to regions offering lower-cost production 
conditions. Since the mid-1990s, such regions have 
included the Brazilian north-east and, in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, other countries, 
including those from Asia. 
The paper consists of this introduction and three 
other sections. Section II sets out the concepts and 
theoretical relations that underpin the subsequent 
discussion, highlighting two issues: firstly, it presents 
the concept of local productive cluster, based on the 
seminal discussion on industrial districts, identifying the 
structural dimensions that lead to better performance, 
particularly geographic proximity; and secondly it 
clarifies the notion of competitiveness in terms of 
cluster development. Section III considers the evolution 
of  the Vale do Sinos footwear-industry cluster, in 
terms of  its performance and relocation. It first 
describes the activity in terms of business structure, 
location in Brazilian territory and its employment 
and export trends; and it then analyses the steps 
taken by the cluster to adapt to the new competitive 
environment arising from Brazilian macroeconomic 
policy in the presence of lower-cost competitors in 
its key markets. Section IV summarizes the main 
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II
industrial organization and competitiveness
Since the 1970s, there has been a consensus in the 
economic literature and among policymakers that 
economic performance does not depend exclusively 
on large-scale production or standardization, with 
little importance given to the specifics of the region 
where the goods are produced. Until then, relatively 
backward regions attempted to imitate the “best 
practices” of developed countries through an import-
substitution strategy. The crisis of the “Fordist” model 
and successful experiences in various parts of  the 
world, such as the so-called “Third Italy” (Emilia-
Romagna, Veneto, Toscana, Marche, among other 
localities), which have achieved economic growth 
based on small geographically neighbouring firms 
engaging in flexible production of  differentiated 
goods in small batches, have shown that economic 
growth can also be achieved by exploiting the specific 
features of local regions and the way their economic 
activity is organized. 
In the theoretical domain, an attempt was made 
to revive the insights of  Alfred Marshall (1842-
1924), who argued that industrial organization, with 
geographically clustered firms, can generating efficiency 
gains similar to those of the internal economies of 
the firm. Through a social division-of-labour process, 
small firms, which benefit from the local labour market 
and other agglomeration economies, can also engage 
in efficient economic activity through productive 
specialization (Marshall, 1982). 
In their famous work The Second Industrial 
Divide, Piore and Sabel (1984) claim that the Italian 
experience is an example of a new form of industrial 
organization —flexible specialization— which can 
overcome the constraints on economic expansion 
faced by the mass-production model. Nonetheless, 
it was Italian economists (Becattini, 1992; Bagnasco, 
1999; and others), who drew most on the Marshallian 
concept of the industrial district, to include the social 
dimension in explanations of economic performance.1 
The community/enterprise combination would be 
a distinctive factor in situations that produce an 
accidental agglomeration of independent firms acting 
1  Mention should also be made of the seminal work of Granovetter 
(2001), who introduced the notion of “social embeddedness”. 
independently, but linked to the same economic 
activity (Becattini, 1992 and 1999).
To set up that particular form of  industrial 
organization, the “enterprise population” needs to 
organize itself  to specialize in one or more stages of 
the production processes of the branch of industry or 
sector in question. In addition to the main product, 
the more broadly defined sector encompasses activities 
that produce machinery and equipment, inputs 
and materials, among other things, which Marshall 
referred to as “auxiliary”. Linked to the enterprise 
cluster, there would also be a system of values and 
ideas relating to ethics, the practice of reciprocity, 
family and other characteristics of social coexistence, 
which would become a condition for reproduction of 
the district; together with a system of institutions, 
other than the market and the firms themselves, 
that include school, unions, political parties and 
cultural associations, among others (Becattini, 1990 
and 1992). In this regard, other references for the 
term “industrial district” can be found, such as local 
productive cluster.2 
The analytical benefits of  the concept of 
industrial district, as disseminated by these studies, 
include that of conceiving the small firm as an entity 
that is also capable of generating growth.3 This does 
not contradict the idea that small size per se has 
limitations; but, as noted by Sengenberger and Pyke 
(1991), size constraints can be mitigated or overcome 
when smaller firms coexist in geographic proximity 
with others, rather than acting in isolation. 
The public policy implications were not minor. 
Policy, generally formulated at the national level, 
targeted large firms or specific sectors chosen to 
promote growth; but that changed when the small 
2  That is the expression used in the literature on the subject, 
from which other expressions are derived and are often used 
interchangeably. Apart from the term “industrial districts” as 
such, the most common include local productive clusters, local 
production systems, enterprise clusters and networks. Although 
different words aim to express different meanings, these terms are 
generally used to refer to groupings of firms that are geographically 
close to each other, mutually related and connected also with other 
local stakeholders. 
3  For discussion of different contributions to the topic of enterprise 
clusters, see Suzigan (2006).
160
ThE fooTWEAR IndUSTRy In VALE do SInoS (bRAzIL): ComPETITIVE AdJUSTmEnT 
In A LAboUR-InTEnSIVE SECToR  •  AChyLES bARCELoS dA CoSTA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 1  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 0
firm became the focus of attention. Nonetheless, the 
objectives of government actions always took account 
of small firms, although the instruments targeted the 
firm as an individual entity. The novelty now is that 
those policies are targeting enterprise clusters and 
their productive environment. Thus the industrial-
district concept proved useful for dealing with small 
firms, and has been incorporated into the country’s 
industrial and technology policies.4
A key point is that location in a local productive 
cluster in itself  is a positive factor for a firm’s 
competitive performance, particularly in the case of 
smaller firms. Membership of organizational networks 
of that type enables small firms to overcome their 
inherent managerial, financial and technological 
and other shortcomings, which often make it 
impossible for them to survive in markets when acting 
individually and in isolation. The division of labour 
practised in industrial districts enables entrepreneurs 
to enter economic activities with little capital, since 
specialization in specific stages of the production cycle, 
or specific product components, obviously requires less 
capital than setting up an integrated plant. In general, 
such undertakings usually emerge at the initiative of 
local residents. This involves, as Marshall notes, the 
existing “industrial atmosphere”, which generates 
the conditions for such adventurers: “The mysteries 
of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were 
in the air (…)” (Marshall, 1982, p. 234).
For Sorenson and Audia (2000), relations forged 
in the locality and the tacit knowledge of the business, 
among other factors, explain why industrial sectors 
remain geographically concentrated through time. 
The fact that certain activities persist locally —more 
business start-ups than failures— relates much more to 
business opportunities that open up for local residents 
(such as employees who start their own business), 
which are not easily accessible to outsiders, than to 
advantages such as the existence of raw materials, 
production and distribution in certain localities. Local 
4  For example, as happened in Italy with Law 317/91 (Mistri, 
1999). In the case of Brazil, the 2004 industrial policy explicitly 
included the concept of local productive cluster. This concept is 
also used to guide the actions of institutions working with small 
firms, such as the Brazilian Microenterprise and Small Business 
Support Service (sebrae). Material printed to disseminate the 
actions of this service for the leather and footwear sector in Rio 
Grande do Sul explicitly states that, since 2003, and in accordance 
with national sebrae guidelines, the action of sebrae of  Rio 
Grande do Sul moved from an individual-solution approach 
for its clients to progressively responding to collective needs and 
opportunities, while respecting regional differences.
inhabitants have an additional asset in the form of 
“social capital” (Bourdieu, 1998; Coleman, 1988; 
Putnam, 1996), which is inherent to the locality and 
thus makes it hard for outsiders to enter the activity 
in question.
An issue to note in relation to studies of industrial 
districts is that this type of productive organization 
arises from a natural development process and 
displays elements that reflect the idiosyncrasies of 
the localities in question. Such elements are not the 
result of  deliberate actions, although actions can 
be undertaken to promote and consolidate already 
established structures. The historical nature of the 
development of industrial districts is the basis for 
its spatial structural diversity and, conceptually, the 
basis for controversies over its properties. 
Naturally, the concept is more empirical than 
theoretical (Bianchi, 1998). The same structural and 
performance dimensions may be present with specific 
features in various districts, and in those that produce 
similar products but are located in different regions 
(Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999; Paniccia, 1998), 
which makes the concept somewhat indeterminate 
(McNaughton, 2000). There are districts in which 
the productive structure is dominated by small firms, 
as in the Italian experience (Becattini and Rullani, 
1996). In others, large firms serve as attractors for 
employment and sales to the external market, for 
example the footwear industry in Vale do Sinos. 
Then there are districts where competitiveness is 
based on the availability of  abundant resources 
or cheap labour, while others are characterized by 
products with local peculiarities, skilled labour and 
high value-added (Sengenberger and Pyke, 1991). 
Another point that has been the subject of research 
is the possibility of reproducing industrial districts. 
As they are the outcome of historical development, 
their characteristics will not necessarily be repeated 
in different geographical spaces or time periods. This 
is a constraint, even for the implications of public 
policy, as highlighted by Amin (1994) but minimized 
by others (Ripoll, 1999).
An important issue that is still open for 
debate concerns the evolutionary dynamic of those 
organizational networks, and the development paths 
of their individual component firms. Changes in the 
patterns of  final demand for the district’s output, 
technological innovations, the availability and 
price of  resources and labour, the pace of  capital 
accumulation by individual firms, and the emergence 
of new geographic zones offering favourable productive 
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conditions, among other factors, mould and modify 
the configuration of a given enterprise cluster through 
time.5 In research undertaken in 24 districts, Paniccia 
(1998) found various forms of  organization and 
different levels of performance, along with relations 
between firms that had conflicts of interest. It remains 
to be decided which factors might limit the expansion 
of a cluster in a given region and under what conditions 
those factors would appear.
The notion of the district’s natural development 
stems from the fact that, over a period of time, a 
product has been created in a specific locality; and 
the fact that consumers clearly associate the product 
and its characteristics with the locality rather than 
a specific firm. These factors provide a degree of 
autonomy in generating endogenous forces for cluster 
growth.6 According to Piore (2001), this gives it a 
competitive advantage that makes it independent of 
changes in the relative prices of factors of production,
5  The Vale do Sinos footwear industry cluster, which was craft-
based and dominated by small firms at the time of its entry into 
the external market, has since undergone a number of changes. 
Its work process began to focus on “Fordist” production, as it 
began producing for the external market (Costa, Deberofski 
and Spricigo, 2007); and large firms came to play an key role in 
cluster dynamics.
6  There are several examples, including carbonated beverages in 
France; wines from the Oporto region in Portugal; Italian table 
cheese; and furniture from Gramado, in Rio Grande do Sul. 
although this author considers that the advantage 
is more reflective of the social relations established 
among residents than the physical characteristics of 
the locality itself. 
Nonetheless, not all districts or productive clusters 
have those characteristics. The historical nature of the 
district’s development means that is not uncommon to 
find a cluster in which competitiveness stems from the 
availability of a given abundant and cheap resource, 
especially in labour-intensive production sectors, such 
as footwear, furniture and clothing, and located in 
less developed regions of the world. Moreover, the 
subordinate way in which the sectors of the footwear 
industry in those regions enter the external market, 
makes them more dependent and relatively locked 
in by that situation, which diminishes their degrees 
of freedom to implement autonomous strategies for 
growth and upgrading in the value chain. 
Such is the case of the Brazilian footwear industry, 
particularly its key export segment located in Vale do 
Sinos, in the south of the country. An understanding 
of the competitive performance of that industry and 
its future prospects requires identifying the product 
attribute on which the cluster depended to remain in 
the external market, and the type of competition in 
which it has been participating. These factors shed light 
on its growth path and the relations of co-operation 
and competition established between stakeholders in 
the district and with external agents, in addition to 
its spatial relocation.
III
Evolution and spatial location of footwear 
production in Brazil
The footwear sector is an important source of jobs 
and income in the Brazilian economy. According 
to data from the annual social information report 
[Relação Anual de Informações Sociais] published by 
the Ministry of Labour and Employment, in 2005, the 
activity employed 298,659 workers in 9,032 business 
establishments, of which 94.7% consisted of micro and 
small enterprises, as shown in table 1. Nonetheless, 
this type of firm accounted for just one third (33.6%) 
of employment, owing to the concentration of jobs in 
the larger firms, which provided 40% of employment 
in the industry but represented just 1% of the total 
number of business establishments. 
The business structure was not always as shown 
in table 1, but reflects the outcome of the sector’s 
development process since its incursion into the external 
market in the late 1960s. Until then, the activity was 
undertaken by small and medium-sized firms that 
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were relatively integrated and eminently craft-based.7 
The country’s per capita income level was relatively 
low by international standards, which meant that the 
quality of the footwear produced was consistent with 
relatively unsophisticated consumption standards in 
terms of materials and technology. The lack of entry 
barriers characteristic of the sector made it possible 
to satisfy demand growth largely by increasing the 
number of  firms, which were mostly small ones. 
Population density —Brazil is a country of continental 
dimensions— allowed for many firms and a large 
production volume, which to some degree enabled 
the sector to try to satisfy external demand.
In terms of  location, although footwear 
manufacturing has always been present in the different 
regions of the country, the industry has for long been 
concentrated in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and 
São Paulo. Concentration in those states, as shown 
in table 2, reflects the industry’s historical formation, 
which was the combined result of  settlement by 
immigrants with skills in the manufacture of leather 
products and the local availability of that basic raw 
material. In Rio Grande do Sul, it was assisted by 
the arrival of German colonists in 1824 and access 
to leather, a relatively abundant byproduct of corned 
beef (charque) in which the state was then pre-eminent. 
In São Paulo, the activity took root in the city of 
Franca, based on Italian immigration dating back to 
1875. The rise of certain states in the north-east of the 
7  Until the late 1970s, the work process in the footwear sector 
was organized around “caballetes” —a wooden furniture items 
shaped similarly to a bookshelf, nearly 1 m high and with four or 
five shelves roughly 1.5 m long. It has wheels on its base so that 
it can be moved along the factory floor. Mechanization of the 
productive process was incipient: a number of manual tools were 
used and the footwear production cycle was relatively integrated 
(Costa, Deberofski and Spricigo, 2007).
country is more recent, and, as shown below, reflects 
their policies to attract firms into the region. 
As footwear manufacturing is an activity that can 
be subdivided in time and space, production can be 
undertaken in business clusters located geographically 
close to one another. This pattern can be seen in specific 
regions of several Brazilian states: Vale do Sinos, in 
Rio Grande do Sul; Franca, in São Paulo and Nova 
Serrana, in Minas Gerais, among others.8 
The leading footwear manufacturing cluster in 
Brazil is located in Vale do Sinos.9 Footwear production 
and its productive chains generate thousands of jobs 
in Rio Grande do Sul. According to information 
contained in Relação Anual de Informações Sociais, 
published by the Ministry of Labour and Employment 
in 2005 (see table 3), in Rio Grande do Sul, there are 
over 15,100 workers in the tannery segment apart from 
the employees in the footwear industry itself, making 
a total of 141,945 workers employed directly in the 
leather-footwear segments of that productive chain. 
This figure represented 23.5% of total employment 
in manufacturing industry in Rio Grande do Sul that 
year, with thousands of families depending on those 
activities for their economic sustenance. 
8  The exceptions in terms of places where the activity is important, 
are the states of the north-east: Ceará, Bahia and Paraíba, whose 
presence in the industry is primarily due to their policies to attract 
firms from the Brazilian south and south-east, but do not yet have 
developed footwear industry clusters.
9  Vale do Sinos, an abbreviation for Vale do Rio dos Sinos, consists 
of nearly 30 municipalities located around the Sinos river and its 
tributaries. Footwear is produced in most of those municipalities 
as a result of  the sector’s own expansion. Nonetheless, some 
localities are particularly important: Campo Bom, Dois Irmãos, 
Igrejinha, Ivoti, Nova Hartz, Novo Hamburgo, Parobé, Sapiranga 
and Três Coroas, among others. The activity is also pursued in 
other municipalities of Rio Grande do Sul unrelated to the region, 
but on a small scale. 
TABLE 1
distribution of business establishments and employment
in the Brazilian footwear industry by firm size, 2005
Size  Employment Percentage  Establishments Percentage
Microenterprise 32 736 11 7 015 77.7
Small 67 514 22.6 1 534 17
Medium 78 949 26.4 388 4.3
Large 119 460 40 95 1
Total 298 659 100 9 032 100
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of  statistics obtained from Relação Anual de Informações Sociais, published by the 
Ministry of  Labour and Employment of  Brazil. 
Microenterprise: 0-19 employees. Small: 20-99 employees. Medium sized: 100-499 employees. Large: 500 employees or more.
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The trend of production in the footwear industry 
in Brazil can be divided in two historical phases. In 
the first, from the start of the activity in the country 
until the end of the 1960s, production targeted the 
domestic market. The second phase starts at the end of 
that decade when the sector begins producing for the 
external market, taking advantage of the relocation 
of  footwear production from developed countries 
to regions of the world that have plentiful supply of 
cheap labour, such as Brazil, the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan Province of China.10
The first Brazilian footwear exports were shipped 
in 1968, and they started to expand from 1970 onwards, 
as shown in Table 4. 
10  Brazil also implemented tax incentives and a policy of small 
exchange-rate devaluations, as from 1968 (Costa, 2004). 
TABLE 2
distribution of employment in the Brazilian footwear
industry by selected states, 2005
State No. of  jobs % No. of  establishments %
Rio Grande do Sul (rs) 126 784 42.4 3 419 37.8
São Paulo, (sp) 54 570 18.3 2 776 30.7
Ceará (ce) 44 268 14.8 221 2.5
Minas Gerais (mg) 23 515 7.9 1 493 16.5
Bahia (ba) 22 973 7.7 95 1.1
Paraíba (pb) 8 461 2.8 104 1.1
Santa Catarina (sc) 5 696 1.9 321 3.6
Other states 12 392 4.2 603 6.7
Total 298 659 100 9 032 100
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of statistics obtained from Relação Anual de Informações Sociais published by the Ministry 
of  Labour and Employment in Brazil.
TABLE 3
Employment in the footwear and leather industries
in rio Grande do Sul by establishment size, 2005
Size Footwear manufacture Tanneries Total
 Employment % Employment % Employment %
Microenterprise 11 044 8.7 656 4.3 11 700 8.2
Small 29 629 23.4 3 026 20 32 655 23
Medium-sized 39 781 31.4 8 571 56.5 48 352 34.1
Large 46 330 36.5 2 908 19.2 49 238 34.7
Total 126 784 100 15 161 100 141 945 100
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of  statistics contained in Relação Anual de Informações Sociais published by the Ministry 
of  Labour and Employment.
As table 4 shows, foreign sales of Brazilian footwear 
expanded rapidly in the 1970s. The physical volume 
exported grew by roughly ninefold in just five years from 
1970 to 1975, and this performance was maintained 
until the mid-1990s, albeit at a slower pace.
Nonetheless, the Brazilian footwear sector entered 
the foreign market in a subordinate role, operating 
merely with outsourced capacity; and this remains 
the case today. In other words, footwear design, final 
sale of the product to consumers, marketing and price 
setting, have always been controlled by the importer. 
Exports were mainly sent to the United States market, 
which from then became the main individual buyer 
of Brazilian footwear. The products exported were 
relatively simple —sandals for the women’s footwear 
segment— produced in large batches and with price as 
the main competitive attribute. Although the quality 
of  the footwear produced in the sector improved 
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through time, partly as a result of  technological 
dissemination in terms of the machinery, equipment 
and materials used in the activity internationally, its 
competitiveness was always based on low production 
cost.11 This point is relevant for understanding the 
spatial movement of the activity not only in Brazil, 
but also elsewhere in the world. 
Brazilian footwear exports were produced by 
firms in the Vale do Sinos footwear cluster, in Rio 
Grande do Sul, and their counterparts in Franca, in 
the state of São Paulo. Table 5 shows the footwear-
export shares of  selected Brazilian states. Exports 
of women’s shoes quickly became concentrated in 
the Vale do Sinos cluster, reflecting its specialization 
pattern, with Franca specializing in men’s footwear. 
Participation by other Brazilian states in exports is 
relatively recent. 
11  Obviously, several elements affect final competitive performance. 
Schmitz (1999 a and b) seeks to explain the competitive path of 
the footwear sector in Vale do Sinos through what is known as 
“collective efficiency”, in other words apart from the externalities 
produced by the productive cluster, there is the joint action of 
entities and firms in developing the local activity. This is not the 
place to discuss this point, but merely to observe, for example, that 
the exchange rate arising from the macroeconomic environment 
has played a key role in the competitive difficulties faced by the 
sector, as will be seen below. 
TABLE 4
Brazilian footwear exports, 1970-2006






1990 143 1 107
1993 201 1 846
1995 138 1 414
1999 137 1 278
2000 163 1 547
2001 171 1 615
2002 164 1 449
2003 189 1 549
2004 212 1 809
2005 189 1 886
2006 180 1 854
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of statistics obtained 
from Sistema de Análise das Informações de Comércio Exterior via 
Internet (alice-Web) of the Ministry of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade of  Brazil (mdic) [online] http://aliceweb.
desenvolvimento.gov.br. and Abicalçados (Brazilian Footwear 
Industries Association) (2005), Resenha estatística, [online] http://
www.abicalcados.com.br.
TABLE 5
footwear-export share of selected Brazilian 
states by value, 1996-2006 
(Percentages)
Year rs sp ce ba pb mg sc
1996 88.6 9.5 0.6 ... 0.2 0.2 0.6
1997 88.1 8.3 2.3 ... 0.3 0.2 0.6
1998 86.0 7.4 4.9 0 0.7 0.2 0.4
1999 84.9 7.1 5.6 0.1 1.3 0.3 0.5
2000 83.5 8.7 5.2 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.4
2001 81.5 8.2 6.6 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.4
2002 80.4 8.0 7.6 1.1 1.6 0.3 0.5
2003 74.1 9.4 10.8 1.8 2.0 0.7 0.5
2004 70.3 12.2 10.3 2.8 2.1 0.9 0.5
2005 69.3 12.6 10.8 3.0 1.9 0.9 0.5
2006 67.6 11.3 12.8 3.4 2.3 0.8 0.5
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of statistics obtained 
from Sistema de Análise das Informações de Comércio Exterior via 
Internet (alice-Web) of the Ministry of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade of  Brazil (mdic) [online] http://aliceweb.
desenvolvimento.gov.br.
rs: Rio Grande do Sul. sp: São Paulo. ce: Ceará. ba: Bahia. 
pb: Paraíba. mg: Minas Gerais. sc: Santa Catarina.
This rapid incursion of Brazilian footwear on the 
external market had far-reaching economic and social 
implications in the Vale do Sinos region. When exports 
began, the “Vale” region, as a footwear producer, 
involved just a few neighbouring municipalities, 
such as São Leopoldo, Estância Velha, Campo Bom, 
Sapiranga and Novo Hamburgo. The latter became 
the hub of the activity and has been recognized as 
the “national footwear capital” ever since.
As this is a labour-intensive and relatively 
unmechanized activity, the rate of growth of orders 
from abroad called for a major expansion of  the 
sector, with consequent additional demand for labour, 
raw materials and other inputs. As the labour supply 
available in those municipalities was insufficient to 
meet demand from the firms, workers were drawn in 
from various localities in Rio Grande do Sul, as a 
result of individual initiatives by workers themselves, 
and actions promoted by the firms.12 A recruitment 
12  These workers, most of them from the countryside, but also 
from other productive activities, seldom had any training in 
footwear production tasks. Some of them even found it hard to 
adapt to factory discipline. That labour force profile, linked to the 
need to meet high-volumes footwear orders of a single model and 
with one or two colours, led to the introduction of the conveyor 
belt and “Taylorist-Fordist” models of work organization which, 
according to Costa, Deberofski and Spricigo (2007), occurred at 
the start of the 1970s.
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scheme used at the time involved dispatching buses 
to other municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul, which 
would circulate through the cities to “pick up” workers. 
The company representative on board the bus would 
use a megaphone to advise local inhabitants of job 
vacancies in the industry.13 
Obviously this required an expansion of urban 
infrastructure in terms of  housing, transport and 
schools, which also was supported by the municipal 
authorities. The growing population density not only 
raised the cost of reproducing the labour force but 
also spawned the social disadvantages associated 
with greater agglomeration, which led the firms to 
change their labour recruitment strategy. Instead of 
making workers travel to the municipalities in which 
the company’s headquarters were situated, the latter 
started to set up additional plants in the municipalities 
where the workers lived, with a twin purpose: to reduce 
the pressure on urban infrastructure and to avoid 
higher labour costs. Employees working in their home 
neighbourhood could be paid less than those working 
at headquarters, because those living in agricultural 
areas would have access to horticultural and farm 
products, as well as the opportunity to participate 
in a subsistence activity of  some kind (Costa and 
Fligenspan, 1997).
The geographical boundaries of  the Vale do 
Sinos footwear industry cluster thus started to spread 
beyond its original municipalities. In research on the 
migration of footwear firms from Vale do Sinos to the 
Brazilian north-east, which considered 42 medium-
sized and large firms, Costa and Fligenspan (1997) 
found that some had plants in other municipalities of 
Rio Grande do Sul, in addition to that of their main 
headquarters; and a total of almost 30 localities were 
detected where there was another production unit.
The expansion conditions for Vale do Sinos firms 
both in the region and elsewhere in Rio Grande do 
Sul lasted until the mid-1990s, when the sector was 
confronted by a new competitive environment. The 
changes in the basis of competition in the sector relate 
to two main types of  factors. One of  them stems 
from the macroeconomic policy implemented by the 
Brazilian government following the launch of  the 
Real Plan in July 1994, which attempted to stabilize 
the economy through monetary and exchange-rate 
policy. By pegging the exchange rate between the 
13  This brief undocumented “history” was recounted to the author 
by a manager of the firm located in Campo Bom during the research 
undertaken by Costa and Fligenspan (1997).
real and the United States dollar, an exchange-rate 
appreciation was generated which, while effective 
for keeping domestic prices in check, made export 
products such as footwear less competitive.14 
The second set of factors concerns the presence 
on international markets of  footwear made by 
competitors operating under a much more favourable 
productive conditions than their Brazilian counterparts, 
including Asian producers particularly from China 
and Vietnam. Drawing on the supply of abundant 
labour earning much lower wages than those paid 
in other footwear-producing countries, the Chinese 
started to attract demand from customers that 
previously purchased from Brazilian, Italian, Mexican, 
Taiwanese and other firms.15 For the Brazilian footwear 
industry in particular, which competes on price, the 
exchange-rate appreciation and competitors with 
lower production costs had a drastic impact on its 
export performance.
Foreign markets were lost because, as from the 
mid-1990s, firms operating as intermediaries between 
footwear importers and Brazilian manufacturers whose 
business units were located in Vale do Sinos, started 
to move to the city of Dongguan in the Guangdong 
region of southern China, in pursuit of lower-priced 
footwear. In an interview with the newspaper Folha de 
São Paulo (20 November 2008, p. B7), the owner of 
one of those firms, Paramont Asia, the largest exporter 
of  women’s shoes from China, cited competitive 
difficulties faced by local producers making cheap 
footwear from synthetic material, compared to those 
produced in Asia stated as the reason for leaving 
Brazil. The firms also took experienced Brazilian 
14  The nominal exchange rate fell from R$ 0.94 to R$ 0.84 per 
dollar between July and December 1994; and Guimarães (1995, 
cited in Costa and Fligenspan, 1997) estimates the appreciation 
of  the Brazilian currency at 10.6% in real terms, comparing 
its average 1994 dollar value with its value in December 1996. 
Moreover, if  the comparison is made between that month and 
earlier periods, using the average values for 1991 and 1992, the 
appreciation amounts to 30.2%. Exchange-rate policy remained 
relatively rigid until January 1999, when the Government changed 
the currency regime and put the real into a free float; whereupon it 
depreciated from R$ 1.21 per dollar on 12 January 1999 to R$ 1.98 
on 29 January 1999 —a 63.3% rise in the nominal exchange rate 
in under a month (www.ipeadata.gov.br consulted on 8 December 
2006). From 2004 onwards, the real appreciated once again: having 
reached a level of R$ 3.95 per dollar in October 2002, its nominal 
exchange rate was fluctuating around R$ 1.80 per dollar in late 
2009 and early 2008.
15  The dissertation by Machado (1997) shows, for example, that 
the average monthly wage in the sports footwear segment was 
US$ 100 in Vietnam, US$ 120 in China, US$165 in Indonesia, 
US$ 188 in Thailand and US$190 in Taiwan Province of China, 
compared to US$ 295 in Brazil.
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workers with them to China, to supervise and provide 
quality control for production in Chinese factories 
that received footwear orders. There is currently a 
Brazilian community in that region, most of which 
originally came from Vale do Sinos. 
As shown in table 6, Brazilian footwear exports 
to the United States have stalled in absolute terms, 
although that country is the main individual purchaser 
of footwear on the international market; this trend 
represented a fall in market share from 9.2% in 1990 
to 4.7% in 2004. The Chinese, on the other hand, 
who until the mid-1980s had a very small presence 
in the United States statistics, contributing just 1.9% 
of that country’s footwear imports in 1981 (Santos 
and others, 2002), gradually began to gain market 
share and by 2004 were making 83.5% of the shoes 
imported by the United States.
The effect of this competitive pressure on the 
Brazilian footwear industry provoked a major crisis 
in the sector, with a nominal export values dropping 
from a total of US$ 1.85 billion in 1993 to US$ 1.28 
billion in 1999, with concomitant job losses. According 
to data contained in Relação Anual de Informações 
Sociais published by the Ministry of  Labour and 
Employment, the number of workers in the footwear 
industry nationwide fell by about 56,000, from 240,600 
in 1994 to 184,700 in 1998. The Rio Grande do Sul 
footwear sector shed over 33,000 workers in that 
process, with the number of employees falling from 
128,900 in 1994 to 95,500 in 1998.
Responding to the competitive pressure required 
support from the Government, together with defensive 
actions such as the business closure, job losses, and 
capacity downsizing. A rise in tariff  barriers and the 
granting of credit lines for productive modernization 
of the sector were the first public-policy measures 
adopted at that time. In the business domain, especially 
in the case of large firms, proactive measures were 
adopted such as the relocation of productive units, 
this time not to other localities of Rio Grande do Sul 
but to regions of the country that offered production 
conditions capable of  allowing the sector to face 
the competition in domestic and external markets, 
particularly from China, while maintaining some 
production activities in Vale do Sinos. This migration 
was assisted by the fact that some Brazilian states, 
especially Ceará and Bahia, offered a set of  tax, 
financial and labour-hiring incentives to attract 
investment and create jobs. 
The north-eastern states focused mostly on 
labour-intensive sectors such as footwear (Costa and 
Fligenspan, 1997; Santos and others, 2002). That 
practice, which would become widespread in the 
mid-1990s within the framework of the “tax war”, 
arose because of the lack of national public policies 
to coordinate and promote industrial investment. 
TABLE 6
United States footwear imports by country of origin: 1990-2004










China 395 719 35.3 949 419 67.4 1 368 344 77.5 1 772 464 83.5
Brazil 103 428 9.2 97 042 6.9 98 540 5.6 98 834 4.7
Indonesia 33 911 6.6 93 177 6.6 76 145 4.3 46 728 2.2
Vietnam 0 0 325 0 7 319 0.4 43 707 2.1
Italy 46 109 4.1 45 680 3.2 52 287 3.0 35 264 1.7
Thailand 34 636 3.1 30 910 2.2 27 571 1.5 25 305 1.2
Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region 19 195 1.7 15 469 1.1 10 577 0.6 19 058 0.9
Mexico 26 178 2.3 33 015 2.4 34 748 2.0 15 722 0.7
Taiwan Province of  China 188 841 16.9 25 924 1.8 13 740 0.8 13 139 0.6
India 3 992 0.4 6 958 0.5 7 096 0.4 8 037 0.4
Rest of  the world 268 653 24 111 313 7.9 68 533 3.9 45 503 2.1
Total 1 120 662 100 1 409 232 100.0 1 764 900 100.0 2 123 761 100
Source: (Alessandro Ramos Carloni and others, Setor de calçados: competitividade, mudança tecnológica e organizacional, vol. 1, 
Brasilia, senai/dn, 2007, table 9).
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From the mid-1990s onwards, large numbers of 
footwear firms from the Vale do Sinos and Franca 
clusters, especially the former, set up business in the 
north-east. A scan of national newspapers for reports 
on the opening of footwear manufacturing plants in 
the north-east shows that, since 1997, there has been 
a migration towards several cities in those states, 
particularly Bahia, as shown in table 7.16
Once established in the north-east, some firms 
started to expand their production capacity in the 
region by adding new productive units. Examples 
include Calçados Azaléia, Dakota Calçados and 
Calçados Paquetá, among others. The relocation of 
production gave those states an increasing share of 
sector exports and employment. Data on the percentage 
distribution of footwear exports by Brazilian states 
shown in table 4 illustrate the shift of the origin of 
16  The first column of the table only lists firms that relocated their 
productive units to the north-east. The listing is illustrative rather 
than exhaustive, because more firms are known to have migrated to 
that region. The other two columns identify the municipalities in the 
states of Bahia and Ceará where these firms set up business. Some 
of them have establishments in more than one municipality, but the 
author is not interested in listing each firm with the municipality in 
which it set up, since that would make the table unduly large and 
add little analytical content to the text. Nonetheless, including a 
spread of the municipalities reveals that the firms, by migrating, 
did not expect to consolidate or benefit from an already developed 
cluster of footwear producers in the region. 
external sales towards the north-eastern region of 
the country. The states of Ceará, Bahia and Paraíba, 
which had less than 1% of footwear exports in 1996, 
were accounting for 18.5% of such exports 10 years 
later. Table 8 reports the corresponding shares of 
employment in the sector. 
As from 1997, jobs in the Brazilian footwear 
industry tended to migrate towards the states of the 
north-east, particularly Bahia and Ceará, and away 
from Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo. In 1996, 
those two north-eastern states accounted for 5% of 
employment, but by 2006 they accounted for 24.5% 
of workers employed in the sector nationwide. In 
contrast, the share of the states of Rio Grande do 
Sul and São Paulo declined in that period by about 
20 percentage points, from 77.6% to 57%.
Nonetheless, the removal of firms to the north-east 
was not just a way to respond to importers’ orders. 
For some firms, the production undertaken there also 
aims to supply the domestic market. For example, 
the Grendene firm, originally from the municipality 
of Farroupilha in Rio Grande do Sul, transferred its 
production of footwear using plastic materials to the 
north-east, setting up several plants in the state of 
Ceará; but it kept its product development activities 
in Farroupilha. According to the firm (newspaper 
Valor, 16 August 2008, p. A4), 85% of its production 
was for the domestic market in 2007. 
TABLE 7
footwear firms from rio Grande do Sul which set up
production units in the state of Bahia, Ceará or both 
Firms from Rio Grande do Sul Localities in Bahia Localities in Ceará
Calçados Belpasso, Calçados Bibi, 
Calçados Cariri, Calçados Jacob, 
Calçados Orquídea, Daiby, 
Dakota Calçados,
Alagoinhas, Amargosa, Castro 
Alves, Conceição do Coité, 
Conceição do Jacuípe,
Baturité, Canindé, Crato, Iguatu, 
Itapajé, Maranguape, Pentecoste,
Dal Ponte, Dilly, Gredene, Heinrich,
J W Calçados, Killing Tintas e Adesivos, 
Leve, Luigi Calçados, Maide,
Paquetá Calçados, Ramarim, Trevo,
Via Uno, Vulcabrás, West Coast
Coração de Maria, Cruz das 
Almas, Feira de Santana, Ipiaú, 
Ipirá, Irará, Itaberaba, Itabuna, 
Itapetinga, Jequié, 
Quixadá, Russas, Sobral, Umirim, 
Uruburetama
Santo Amero da Purificação,
Santo Antonio de Jesus, Santo Estevão, 
São Francisco do Conde, Serrinha, 
Teixeira de Freitas, Terra Nova, Valente, 
Vitória da Conquista
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of  news items obtained from national newspapers in several periods, and from other 
sources.
Note: Three firms on the list belonged to footwear auxiliary segments. 
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TABLE 8 
Share of employment in Brazilian footwear industry, selected states 1994-2006
Year Brazil rs Percentage sp Percentage ba Percentage ce Percentage pb Percentage Other Percentage Total
1994 240 655 128 882 53.6 63 836 26.5 264 0.1 5 081 2.1 5 497 2.3 37 095 15.4 100
1995 196 462 113 692 57.9 41 839 21.3 229 0.1 6 339 3.2 5 688 2.9 28 675 14.6 100
1996 202 768 116 602 57.5 40 752 20.1 153 0.1 9 968 4.9 7 261 3.6 28 032 13.8 100
1997 182 687 101 814 55.7 35 743 19.6 237 0.1 14 449 7.9 6 398 3.5 24 046 13.2 100
1998 184 725 95 526 51.7 34 478 18.7 1 626 0.9 20 243 11 7 297 3.9 2 555 13.8 100
1999 211 582 108 026 51.1 41 452 19.6 4 967 2.3 22 880 10.8 7 758 3.7 26 499 12.5 100
2000 240 392 120 596 50.2 46 613 19.4 8 350 3.5 27 287 11.3 8 359 3.5 29 187 12.1 100
2001 248 829 129 591 52.1 45 609 18.3 10 431 4.2 27 353 11 7 883 3.2 27 962 11.2 100
2002 262 537 130 510 49.7 46 586 17.7 11 856 4.5 36 770 14 6 700 2.6 30 115 11.5 100
2003 272 124 129 311 47.5 48 009 17.6 15 418 5.7 41 454 15.2 6 185 2.3 31 747 11.7 100
2004 312 579 143 022 45.8 56 993 18.2 19 781 6.3 45 982 14.7 7 192 2.3 39 609 12.7 100
2005 298 659 126 784 42.5 54 570 18.3 22 973 7.7 44 268 14.8 8 461 2.8 41 603 13.9 100
2006 295 222 116 524 39.5 51 681 17.5 24 282 8.2 48 309 16.3 11 692 4 42 734 14.5 100
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of  statistics contained in Relação Anual de Informações Sociais, published by the Ministry 
of  Labour and Employment of  Brazil
rs: Rio Grande do Sul. sp: São Paulo. ce: Ceará. ba: Bahia. pb: Paraíba. 
The exchange rate has played a key role in the 
trend of total employment in the Brazilian footwear 
sector, through the decline in exports. As noted 
above, employment declined when the local currency 
appreciated in real terms between 1994 and 1998 (see 
table 8), but then rebounded when the exchange rate 
returned to more competitive levels in 1999-2004. From 
2004 to 2008, when the real appreciated once again, 
exports declined and employment in the sector fell 
back, although to a lesser extent owing to demand 
from the domestic market. The trend of employment in 
the sector is thus closely related to its export capacity, 
as shown above in table 5.17 These adverse effects on 
activity caused the Government to provide assistance 
to the sector once again. In April 2007, it imposed 
tariff  restrictions on imported footwear, by raising 
the import quota (common external tariff) from 20% 
to 35%, the maximum allowed by the rules of the 
World Trade Organization (wto). 
In additional support, the Government promoted 
a credit line for firms through the National Economic 
and Social Development Bank (bndes), drawing on 
resources held in the Worker Protection Fund (fat), to 
offer conditions for sector modernization. Nonetheless, 
as regards the effectiveness of this incentive, it should 
be noted that the sector’s competitive difficulties do not 
stem from obsolescence in the productive apparatus, 
but from the exchange rate and labour costs relative to 
those of Asian countries. The technological upgrading 
17  Exports represent about 30% of total sector production. 
process had already taken place, following the first 
crisis that began in 1994 (Costa and Fligenspan, 
1997). Firms continued to move their productive 
units to the states of the Brazilian north-east for no 
other reason. 
The sector’s effort to remain price-competitive 
in the market had a major effect on the labour 
market, causing deteriorating job quality. As shown 
in table 9, wage ranges narrowed throughout the 
period 1995-2006, which led to an increase in the 
number of  workers receiving lower pay. In 1995, 
just 18% of workers employed in the sector earned 
up to 1½ times the minimum wage, whereas in 2006, 
62% of employed workers were in that pay bracket. 
Higher paid workers (above five times the minimum 
wage) accounted for 9.9% of the total in 1995, but 
just 3.4% by 2006.
The adjustment in that most recent phase is a 
new departure: firms from Vale do Sinos are also 
starting to set up production units outside the 
country: Calçados Paquetá is inaugurating a plant 
in Argentina.18 Calçados Azaléia has marketing units 
in Colombia and has opened an office in China from 
which it outsources footwear production to supply 
its customers in the United States; and West Coast is 
outsourcing its production in Argentina, India and 
Guatemala (Valor, 6 and July 2007, p. B6). Another 
line of action is the effort made by firms to diversify 
18  In the case of this firm, the decision was taken to avoid the trade 
restrictions on Brazilian footwear imposed by that country. 
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markets, and operate more independentlyin terms of 
marketing their footwear internationally. Selling directly 
to the final importers is a trade policy which large firms 
in particular are pursuing by setting up distribution 
centres abroad, and selling to the importer, while using 
the latter’s brands. Another type of action involves 
selling abroad through franchises. The pursuit of other 
attributes to enable firms to compete and operate in 
different market niches leads them to develop their own 
brands, by setting up internal departments or sectors 
to develop fashion products, either working on design 
themselves or hiring professional services with that 
specific skill. Those initiatives have attracted attention 
from large and small firms alike (Schuh, 2006), and 
also from institutions working in the sector (Costa, 
2007). In terms of institutional partnerships, projects 
in the sector between the Brazilian Footwear Industries 
Association (Abicalçados), the Brazilian Association 
of Companies of Components for Leather, Footwear 
and Accessories (assintecal), and others, and the 
Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 
(apex) have made it possible to increase the number 
of countries to which the sector supplies footwear 
TABLE 9
Number of workers in the Brazilian footwear industry by average income level 
(relative to the minimum wage), 1995-2006
Income bracket 1995 Percentage 2000 Percentage 2003 Percentage 2006 Percentage
Up to 1.5 times the minimum wage 35 367 18 83 563 34.8 129 900 47.7 182 949 62
1.5 to 3 times the minimum wage 110 134 56.1 122 033 50.8 114 929 42.2 91 435 30.9
3 to 5 times the minimum wage 31 524 16 20 825 8.6 15 441 5.7 10 857 3.7
5 to 15 times the minimum wage 15 159 7.7 11 221 4.7 9 869 3.6 6 827 2.3
+ 15 times the minimum wage 2 067 1.1 1 713 0.7 1 546 0.6 799 0.3
Not classifiable 2 211 1.1 1 037 0.4 439 0.2 2 355 0.8
Total 196 462 100 240 392 100 272 124 100 295 222 100
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of  statistics contained in Relação Anual de Informações Sociais published by the Ministry 
of  Labour and Employment of  Brazil.
Note: The category “not classifiable” corresponds to the number of  workers who did not provide information or provided erroneous 
information.
products. The mechanisms used in such case are business 
roadshows, trade missions and assistance to enable 
firms to participate in international trade fairs.
Meanwhile, the search for other attributes of 
competitiveness calls for structural changes at the 
enterprise and sector levels to make those initiatives 
viable; and these take time to mature. For example, 
the positioning of  a footwear brand requires 
sustained financial investment over time. Moreover, 
the transition from price competition to competition 
based on some other product characteristic is slow and 
costly. Generally, own-brand and design footwear is 
manufactured in small batches and workgroups. This 
in turn requires changes in the layout of production 
and workers with skills other than those required for 
more standardized volume production. Nonetheless, 
volume orders are not expected to disappear, at least 
in the foreseeable future; so firms, particularly the 
large ones, will continue to seek to respond to those 
demands. Ultimately, the search for regions offering 
competitive conditions with lower production costs 
will remain the basis for strategic decision-making 
by the sectors’ firms.
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The Brazilian footwear industry, particularly the 
Vale do Sinos productive cluster, is undergoing major 
changes of direction in response to a new competitive 
environment defined by two key factors: the frequent 
periods of exchange-rate appreciation since 1994, and 
the presence of competitors on international markets 
with more favourable production conditions. 
Footwear manufacture is one of the founding 
sectors of Brazil’s national industry. Production on 
Brazilian soil, although present in various states, has 
from the outset been concentrated in Rio Grande do 
Sul and São Paulo —in the first of these states, in 
the Vale do Sinos region; and in the second, in the 
city of Franca.
Until the late 1960s, the sector consisted of small 
and medium-sized firms, producing for the domestic 
market and using craft-based work processes. By the 
end of that decade, the industry —particularly the Vale 
do Sinos segment— was entering the international 
market, taking advantage of the shift of footwear 
production from developed countries to regions 
offering better productive conditions in terms of labour 
supply and low wages. This incursion happened in a 
subordinate way, with the importer deciding on the 
outsourced production, the model and the price paid 
to the manufacturer, as well as marketing to the final 
consumer. Owing to the size of orders coming from 
abroad, which involved production runs of hundreds 
of thousands or more, and little variety, satisfying that 
demand allowed for rapid and extensive growth and 
led to far reaching structural changes in the sector. 
In terms of  working practices, production 
for the external market led to the introduction of 
“Taylorist-Fordist” organization methods to make 
footwear in large volumes in just one or two colours. 
As a direct-labour-intensive activity, large-volume 
footwear manufacturer required huge numbers of 
workers on the factory floor; and this attracted large 
numbers of workers from other cities in Rio Grande 
do Sul to the export-pioneering municipalities, such 
as Novo Hamburgo, São Leopoldo, Campo Bom y 
Sapiranga. It also caused footwear firms to transfer 
their production units to other locations in the state. 
This relocation caused a geographic expansion of the 
“Vale”, which raised the productive profile of other 
municipalities. 
Until the mid-1990s, the geographical expansion 
of Vale do Sinos footwear production was confined 
to the state of Rio Grande do Sul. From then on, 
however, firms in that productive cluster started to 
relocate their production units in other Brazilian 
states, particularly Bahia and Ceará, as tax, financial 
and labour-hiring incentives drew production and 
employment to the north-eastern region. In 1996, 
those two states were responsible for just 5% of sector 
employment nationwide, but 10 years later this had 
risen to 24.5%. In terms of exports, these two states 
hardly participated at all in the external market in 
1996; but by 2006, along with the state of Paraíba, 
they accounted 18.5% of Brazilian footwear exports 
by value. As a counterpart to this, the share of sector 
employment accounted for by Rio Grande do Sul and 
São Paulo fell by 20.6 percentage points in the same 
period. In terms of export value, as the migration 
of firms to the north-east basically took place from 
Vale do Sinos, the effect was mainly felt in the state 
of Rio Grande do Sul, whose share of sector exports 
dropped from 88.6% in 1996 to 67.6% in 2006. On 
the labour market, apart from the geographical move, 
the quality of employment declined throughout the 
1995-2006 period, as jobs increasingly slipped into 
lower pay brackets. 
In these first few years of the twenty-first century, 
footwear firms have also started to move their 
production out of the country. The pursuit of more 
competitive conditions in terms of production costs 
took them to Asia and Latin America, where they have 
outsourced footwear production lines and set up their 
own shops, franchises and distribution centres.
Nonetheless, for the sector as a whole, competition 
based on production cost is increasingly hard to 
maintain, given the better conditions available to 
the sector’s Asian competitors. One way to overcome 
this situation is for firms to operate with their own 
design and brand, sell directly to the final importer, 
meet smaller orders and ensure swift delivery. But 
that is a relatively slow course to follow, and it has 
only just begun. 
On a theoretical level, the behaviour of firms 
belonging to the Vale do Sinos footwear industry 
cluster raises questions about the evolution of that 
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productive cluster is a factor of competitiveness, why 
do firms stop expanding within such arrangements 
after a certain time, and try to grow outwards, even in 
localities in which the organizational characteristics 
of  that industry are not fully developed? And, 
lastly, what are the limits of that form of industrial 
organization?
As discussed in the theoretical section of this 
article, this concept requires empirical observation, and 
each specific industrial district has its own peculiarities. 
In the case studied here, although footwear production 
in Vale do Sinos takes place within the structural 
characteristics of a cluster, its competitiveness is more 
related to labour costs and the exchange rate than 
to any specific property of the cluster itself. Since 
entering the external market, the sector’s development 
shows that its competitiveness was restricted by the 
prevailing pattern of competition, namely price. Thus, 
as long as conditions were favourable for competing 
on price, the sector expanded. When those conditions 
were adverse, or faltered, the sector started to face 
growth difficulties. That is the key to understanding 
the sector’s performance through time. 
(Original: Portuguese)
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